	Case 2:22-cv-00222-KJM-JDP Document 15	5 Filed 05/23/22	Page 1 of 3
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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
10			
11	Sandra Stenson,	No. 2:22-cv-002	222-KJM-JDP
12	Plaintiff,	ORDER	
13	V.		
14	Lodi Skilled Nursing Services Inc., doing		
15	business as Fairmont Rehabilitation Hospital, et al.,		
16	Defendants.		
17			
18			
19	Plaintiff Sandra Stenson alleges two residents in the defendants' skilled nursing facility		
20	contracted COVID-19, leading to their premature deaths. See Compl. ¶¶ 1–5, ECF No. 2-1. She		
21	asserts claims for elder abuse, health and safety violations, negligence, willful misconduct, and		
22	wrongful death under California law. See id. ¶¶ 37–79.		
23	The defendants removed this action from the San Joaquin County Superior Court in		
24	February of this year. See generally Not. Removal, ECF No. 1. Stenson moves to remand. See		
25	generally Mot. Remand, ECF No. 11. The defendants opposed, and the court submitted the		
26	motion without oral argument. See generally Opp'n, ECF No. 12; Min. Order, ECF No. 14.		
27	A defendant may remove a matter to federal court if the district court would have had		
28	original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Ca	terputar, Inc. v. Wit	uiams, 482 U.S. 386, 393
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Case 2:22-cv-00222-KJM-JDP Document 15 Filed 05/23/22 Page 2 of 3

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(1987). "The removing defendant bears the burden of overcoming the 'strong presumption against removal jurisdiction." *Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop.*, 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). "The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction" means that "the court resolves all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court." *Hunter v. Philip Morris USA*, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

District courts assess removals based on federal question jurisdiction under the wellpleaded complaint rule. *Id.* A well-pleaded complaint must present a federal question on the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 398-99. Generally, a case cannot be removed based on an anticipated federal defense. Id. at 399. "Notwithstanding this rule, when a federal statute wholly displaces state law and provides the exclusive cause of action for a plaintiff's requested relief, [the court] must 'recharacterize a state law complaint . . . as an action arising under federal law." Hawaii ex rel. Louie v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 761 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 64 (1987)). A federal question may therefore arise if a federal law "completely preempts" a state cause of action. Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). A federal question may also arise under the "embedded federal question doctrine." Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 688 (9th Cir. 2022). Under this doctrine, "federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress." *Id.* (quoting *Gunn v. Minton*, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013)); see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).

The defendants advance three theories of this court's jurisdiction. First, they argue Stenson's state-law claims arise under federal law because the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act completely preempts her state law claims. *See* Not. Removal at 5–28 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d, 247d-6e); Opp'n at 6–12 (same). Second, the defendants argue this action involves an embedded federal issue under *Gunn* and *Grable*. *See* Not. Removal at 28–30;

Case 2:22-cv-00222-KJM-JDP Document 15 Filed 05/23/22 Page 3 of 3

Opp'n at 13. Third, the defendants argue this court has jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). *See* Not. Removal at 31–49; Opp'n at 14–20.

The Ninth Circuit and several other federal appellate courts have rejected these and other similar arguments. *See generally Saldana*, 27 F.4th 679 (affirming remand of claims by relatives of a nursing home resident who allegedly died due to complications of COVID-19; rejecting nursing home's jurisdictional arguments based on the PREP Act, the federal officer removal statute, and an embedded federal question); *see also, e.g., Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, L.L.C.*, 28 F.4th 580 (5th Cir. 2022); *Buljic v. Tyson Foods, Inc.*, 22 F.4th 730 (8th Cir. 2021); *Maglioli v. All. HC Holdings LLC*, 16 F.4th 393 (3d Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit's decision in *Saldana* is binding, and the other circuit courts' decisions referenced above reinforce the conclusion that this action cannot be maintained in a federal court. The defendants do not acknowledge these decisions, let alone explain why they are neither binding nor persuasive.

The motion to remand (ECF No. 11) is **granted**. This action is **remanded** to the California Superior Court for San Joaquin County.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 20, 2022.

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE